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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Corey Dale Young appeals the denial of his Rule 35 motion seeking credit 
for time served.1 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The district court on March 5, 2013, entered judgment on Young’s felony 
convictions for burglary, grand theft, and eluding.  (R., pp. 98-100.)  The district 
court imposed consecutive sentences of, respectively, four years determinate, 14 
years with one year determinate, and two years indeterminate, for an aggregate 
sentence of 20 years with five years determinate.  (R., p. 99.)  The district court 
awarded credit against the aggregate sentence for 157 days served.  (Id.) 
 Young filed a “Motion for Credit for Time Served” on December 1, 2015.  
(R., pp. 136-40.)  Relying on State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4, 343 P.3d 30, 33 
(2015), Young contended he was entitled to 157 days credit for time served on 
each count, rather than against the aggregate sentence.  (R., pp. 138-39.)  The 
district court applied the language in Owens limiting the holding in that case only 
to prospective cases and those on direct review.  (R., pp. 149-50.)  Because 
Young’s judgment was final well before Owens was decided, its holding did not 
apply in this case and the motion was therefore denied.  (Id.)  The order denying 
the motion was filed on December 23, 2015.  (R., p. 149.) 
 On July 21, 2016, the district court entered a corrected order denying the 
motion for credit for time served.  (R., p. 151.)  The order states that the 
                                            
1 This is a companion case to Docket No. 43917. 
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correction is because the prior order had confused Young’s companion cases 
and “contained the wrong procedural background.”  (Id.)  Young filed his notice of 
appeal on August 29, 2016.  (R., pp. 153-56.) 
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ISSUES 
 
 Young states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Young’s motion for 
credit for time served? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Young failed to demonstrate the appellate jurisdiction of this Court 
because his notice of appeal is untimely? 
 
2. If this Court has jurisdiction, has Young failed to show error in the district 
court’s application of the clearly stated limitation of the holding in Owens? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
This Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court denied the motion for credit for time served in an order 
entered on December 23, 2015, concluding that the holding of Owens did not 
apply.  (R., pp. 149-50.)  Young did not file a notice of appeal within 42 days of 
this order.  (See, generally, R.)  On July 21, 2016, the district court entered a 
corrected order, which changed the recitation of the procedural history of the 
case but included the same analysis and holding of its prior order.  (R., pp. 151-
52.)  Young’s notice of appeal was filed within 42 days of the corrected order.  
(R., pp. 153-56.)  Because Young’s notice of appeal is timely only from the 
corrected order, and because the corrected order contains the same analysis 
and holding as the original order, Young has failed to show this Court has 
jurisdiction to review the merits of the denial of the motion for credit for time 
served. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“‘A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate courts’] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal.’”  State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 
80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
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57 (1987)).  Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review.  Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
 
C. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Review The Merits Of The District Court’s 
Order 
 
An appeal from the district court “may be made only by physically filing a 
notice of appeal … within 42 days.”  I.A.R. 14(a).  A timely filed notice of appeal 
is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction.  I.A.R. 21; State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 
866, 920 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 
(Ct. App. 1983).  The failure to file a notice of appeal within the time limits 
prescribed by the appellate rules requires “automatic dismissal” of the appeal.  
I.A.R. 21.   
 Re-entering a judgment or other appealable order does not start anew the 
time for filing an appeal.  See State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 306-308, 
246 P.3d 958, 959-961 (2010) (holding that the district court’s re-entry of a 
judgment of conviction did not enlarge the time for filing an appeal where the re-
entered judgment did not alter the material terms of the original judgment); 
Payan, 128 Idaho at 867, 920 P.2d at 83.  An appeal from a re-entered judgment 
or order is timely only as to matters actually altered by the re-entered judgment 
or order, and the appellate court does not have jurisdiction to address matters 
unaffected by re-entry of the judgment or order.  Walton, Inc. v. Jensen, 
132 Idaho 716, 720, 979 P.2d 118, 122 (Ct. App. 1999); Payan, 128 Idaho at 
867, 920 P.2d at 83.   
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In this case, the notice of appeal is timely only from the corrected order 
denying the motion for credit for time served, not the originally filed order.  The 
only change from the original order in the corrected order is the recitation of the 
procedural history of the case.  The holding and analysis for denying the motion 
remain the same.  Therefore, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to address the 
merits of Young’s claim that the holding of the district court denying the motion 
for credit for time served was error.   
 
II. 
Young Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Application Of The Idaho 
Supreme Court’s Limitation On Its Holding In Owens 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 If this Court reaches the issue, Young has failed to show that the district 
court erred when it concluded that the holding in Owens did not apply to Young’s 
motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts.”  State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)).  The interpretation and construction of a statute 
present questions of law over which the appellate court exercises free review.  
State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. 
Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).  
 7 
 
C. Young Has Failed To Show He Is Entitled To Relief That Is Directly 
Contrary To The Supreme Court’s Opinion In Owens 
 
 The district court imposed consecutive sentences on all three counts to 
which Young pled guilty.  (R., p. 99.)  When the district court entered judgment in 
2013, the judgment stated:  “Pursuant to Idaho Code §18-309, the Defendant 
shall be given credit for the time already served in this case in the amount of one 
hundred fifty-seven (157) days.”  (R., p. 99.)     
 In 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Owens, 
158 Idaho 1, 4, 343 P.3d 30, 33 (2015), in which it held, for the first time, that 
“Idaho Code section 18-309’s language plainly gives credit for prejudgment time 
in custody against each count’s sentence.”  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
overruled prior cases holding the contrary.  Id. at 3-5, 343 P.3d at 32-34 
(overruling State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 630 P.2d 143 (1981), as well as 
subsequent cases applying Hoch’s reasoning).  The Court, however, held that its 
decision would not apply retroactively.  Owens, 158 Idaho at 6, 343 P.3d at 35.  
The Court reasoned that because I.C. § 18-309 “does not alter the class of 
persons or the conduct the law punishes,” and because it is “not a watershed rule 
implicating a trial’s fundamental fairness,” its new interpretation of the statute 
would only apply “prospectively and to cases now on direct review.”  Owens, 
158 Idaho at 7, 343 P.3d at 36.  The district court determined that, because 
Young’s judgment was entered approximately two years before Owens was 
decided, Young is not entitled to the benefit of Owens.  (R., pp. 149-52.)   
 On appeal, Young acknowledges the non-retroactivity aspect of Owens, 
but argues it does not preclude his request for credit for time served because he 
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has directly appealed the denial of his Rule 35(c) motion.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 9-13.)  The flaw in Young’s argument is that there was no error in the court’s 
computation of credit for time served at the time the district court calculated it.  
By definition, his motion was to “correct a court’s computation of credit for time 
served.”  I.C.R. 35(c).  Because the calculation was correct at the time made, the 
“correction” Young sought was by application of the 2015 holding in Owens to his 
2013 judgment.  (R., pp. 138-39.)  This was in direct contravention of the 
limitation that the holding was to apply only “prospectively and to cases now on 
direct review.”  Owens, 158 Idaho at 7, 343 P.3d at 36.  To hold that the district 
court erred would render the non-retroactivity aspect of Owens meaningless.   
Young has failed to show any error in the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Young’s appeal or, 
alternatively, affirm the district court’s order denying Young’s motion for credit for 
time served. 
 DATED this 17th day of March, 2017. 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 SALLY J. COOLEY 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.  
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